On 9 September 2025, Israel conducted a precision strike inside the Qatari capital, Doha, targeting a meeting of Hamas political leaders who were discussing a US-sponsored ceasefire proposal. Doha confirmed the death of a member of the Internal Security Force and casualties among Hamas members, while Arab and Israeli assessments affirmed that the targeted leaders survived, including Khalil al-Hayya.
The Office of the Israeli Prime Minister announced that the operation was purely Israeli and Benjamin Netanyahu warned Qatar against hosting Hamas leadership. The United Nations described the action as a flagrant violation of Qatar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Washington stated that the unilateral strike inside Qatar serves neither its objectives nor Israel’s. Many analyses nevertheless questioned whether Washington lacked full knowledge of the operation from the outset.
The strike unsettled the mediation role Qatar has accumulated over two decades. More importantly, it disrupted the confidence of Arab Gulf capitals in the credibility of US security guarantees and raised the likelihood of recalibration in relations with Israel and the tracks of normalization. This can be observed in the state of diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, which do not appear to be in their best condition.
The operational picture indicates highly precise localized destruction inside an operational residential compound, consistent with the use of long-range munitions or missiles launched from outside Qatari airspace. Other analyses held that the precision of the airstrike implies that Israeli aircraft were close enough to Qatar’s borders.
The strike represents the use of force against a sovereign state, which clashes with the Charter of the United Nations. Israel justifies its action as the pursuit of leaders of an armed organization that conducts attacks, a broad reading of cross-border self-defense that faces wide political and diplomatic objection.
At the level of the Gulf security architecture and the strategic relationship with Washington, the strike reveals a gap in the will to curb Israel’s expanding military operations more than a shortfall in American capabilities to intercept missiles. Operationally, defense and early-warning systems function as they should, yet the decision to employ them to deter an Israeli attack that struck a host ally was not taken. As a result, confidence in the American ally appears in doubt, despite Doha’s response to media claims that it would review and expand its military alliances by affirming that its alliance with the United States is today stronger than ever.
Tel Aviv sought to assert that its reach is long and that no terrain enjoys diplomatic immunity when it comes to achieving its objectives. A second objective was to raise the negotiating cost for Hamas. Israel also achieved a direct retaliatory strike against a state whose media outlet Al Jazeera it classifies as one of the most important media arms supporting Hamas. There was also an internal objective related to shoring up the ruling coalition and deflecting domestic criticism of the conduct of the war. These messages and objectives carry countervailing costs. Arab and Western condemnations intersect, which constrains the political cover available to Israel and increases the difficulty of repeating such an operation in the Gulf. It is also notable that the survival of the top targets and the continued impasse over hostage releases render the operational yield limited relative to a political price that appears steep.
Qatari diplomacy worked at full stretch, with Saudi and European support, to marshal decisive and effective international condemnation. The emergency Arab and Islamic summit in Doha did not produce more than expected, yet it is at a minimum part of the Qatari diplomatic effort to respond to the Israeli attack and elevate it to a principal international file rather than a passing military strike to be moved past and forgotten on the strength of President Trump’s assurance that it would not recur.
The likely trajectory is containment, coupled with active legal internationalization and collective Gulf measures that set the tempo and press Washington to prevent a recurrence. In parallel, Israeli presence in the Gulf through the gateways of Abu Dhabi and Manama has become a source of concern more than at any time in the past, not only for Qatar but also for other states, first among them Saudi Arabia.
Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council need to convert the shock into political and institutional leverage and an instrument of control and pressure to recalibrate and define the character of security and defense alliances with Washington so they are more serious and more firmly committed to Gulf security, with clear emphasis that Israel is not an exception. There is also a need to review indigenous air defense and early-warning systems and to close the gap through which the Israeli missiles entered Qatari airspace, and to update and review protocols for the protection of dignitaries and delegations and for sensitive residential zones.
The Israeli strike can be considered a critical inflection point in Gulf security, deterrence equations, and regional balances.
The onus is again on Washington to reaffirm red lines that bar Israel from hostile operations against a system of states it considers allied and reliable, to ensure that Tel Aviv is not a source of threat to the stability of these partners, and to rebuild confidence in the defensive umbrella deployed on their territories.
The Gulf states remain unable to align their foreign policies or arrive at a robust and consensual security architecture. In parallel, states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman continue to seek assurances that the political opening by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain toward Israel will not expose the Gulf to greater threats, risks, and intelligence penetration. Absent such assurances, the balance of risk will outweigh returns and the region will remain vulnerable to sudden tests that redraw red lines downward each time.
