The United Arab Emirates’ firm stance toward the Muslim Brotherhood and a range of political-Islam movements after the Arab Spring of 2011 marked a major turning point in its domestic, regional, and international policies. This stance was not the product of a passing political moment. It culminated a long and complex history of suspicion, caution, rivalry, and, eventually, open confrontation.
In its early founding years, the UAE had been receptive to the Brotherhood’s role as a conservative counterweight to leftist and Arab nationalist currents. That convergence shifted as the movement’s political ambitions expanded at home and across the region. Emirati leaders’ deep recognition of the risks inherent in the Islamist project drove the adoption of a comprehensive strategy to confront it, one that spanned political, religious, and economic domains.
This strategy combined direct security confrontation with the leveraging of regional and international alliances. It asserted control over religious discourse and steered it toward moderation and tolerance, away from politics. It also sought to safeguard economic stability that the UAE judged to be under direct threat from political Islam.
This report examines why the UAE took such a decisive position by exploring four interlinked dimensions. It begins with the historical dimension, tracing the roots of the relationship between the UAE and the Brotherhood. It then turns to the political dimension, which covers the UAE’s regional interests, its relationships with major powers, and its post-2011 strategy toward political Islam. It proceeds to the religious dimension, analysing the UAE’s stance on political Islam as an ideology, its engagement with traditional religious institutions, and its policies on public and private religiosity. It concludes with the economic dimension, where political security intersects with the stability of the domestic and global economy, and with the impact of political-Islam movements on Emirati investments across the region.
Taken together, these dimensions explain the UAE’s hardline position toward the Brotherhood, analyse the motives behind its leadership of this open confrontation, and offer a serious attempt to understand the new governing equation that Emirati leaders have drawn over the past decade.
Historical Dimensions: From Cooperation and Caution to Open Confrontation
The UAE’s antagonistic stance toward the Brotherhood did not suddenly appear after 2011. It resulted from years of anxiety, misgivings, and a latent struggle between the state and the movement. After a period of cautious coexistence in the early years of the federation, the balance gradually shifted in favour of the state as Emirati rulers perceived the Brotherhood’s growing political ambitions. By the time of the Arab Spring, the UAE had reached the conclusion that the survival of its system and the stability of the region required the dismantling of the Brotherhood’s project. The approach moved from defence to offence.
During the 1970s, the UAE permitted a considerable space for Brotherhood activity through a religious and social association known as the Islah and Social Guidance Association, known as al-Islah. Established in the early 1970s, it enjoyed clear and visible government support. Prominent members included teachers, judges, and professionals from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine whom the UAE had recruited in its formative phase. At that time, the Brotherhood, as a conservative force, played a role in countering leftist, nationalist, and communist currents in the region. This comfortable positioning was reinforced by the fact that the movement showed no signs of opposition to the country’s sheikhly system. During the 1980s, al-Islah grew stronger and the influence of Islamists widened across ministries, mosques, universities, and professional associations. A writer from one of the UAE’s ruling families described the Brotherhood’s penetration in that period as akin to a “state within the state.”
The springtime of relations did not last. Members of al-Islah began to voice opposition to certain state policies. They criticised what they saw as the westernisation of society and the spread of moral corruption in Dubai in particular, and they called for political and moral reforms. At this juncture, Emirati citizens within the association started to emerge as leaders and key actors.
In the 1990s, during the 1991 Gulf War, Gulf states’ fears of political Islam intensified after the Brotherhood supported Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The rise of the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia and the return of Gulf fighters from Afghanistan sounded further alarms. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and the federation’s leaders grew increasingly concerned about the expanding influence of Islamists and the Brotherhood inside the UAE. The authorities took gradual steps to curtail the movement. A number of teachers and officials associated with the association were removed from influential posts, some were reassigned to administrative roles, and others were retired. Dubai acted with greater firmness than other emirates and dissolved al-Islah there. The Brotherhood persisted in Ras al Khaimah, which served as a stronghold, and in some of the smaller emirates, which provided a temporary refuge. Up to that point, the UAE had not resorted to mass arrests or public trials. It tightened the space around the movement and isolated it from centres of influence.
The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a pivotal moment, especially with two Emirati nationals among the perpetrators. The UAE began to view all Islamist groups and their activities with heightened suspicion, under additional pressure from the United States, which regarded Gulf domestic policies as insufficient in countering terrorist organisations. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed assumed senior political and security roles and adopted a firm position that saw the Brotherhood as a real threat to the stability of state and rule. The UAE moved swiftly to restructure the security apparatus and expand its powers to monitor the activities of Islamists, whether individuals, preaching groups, or charities. In parallel, Abu Dhabi sought to persuade the other rulers of the emirates that national security and the preservation of state cohesion could not be managed through a fragmented, emirate-by-emirate approach. This strengthened the federal authorities, which had previously been obliged to coordinate and secure the consent of the seven rulers before taking sensitive measures.
Federal authorities were able to track communications and movements linked to members of various Islamist groups, foremost among them the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement lost one of its most prominent defenders with the death of Sheikh Saqr Al Qasimi, ruler of Ras al Khaimah, in 2010. The security services then launched the first major campaign against the group.
The Arab Spring of 2011 delivered a profound shock to the UAE. The fall of entrenched regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya and the rise of the Brotherhood in some of those states were perceived as a direct threat. Abu Dhabi became convinced, without hesitation, that the time had come to eradicate the internal Brotherhood threat before it grew beyond control.
In March 2011, dozens of Emirati intellectuals signed a petition calling for political reforms and an expansion of the powers of the Federal National Council. The authorities responded firmly and arrested some of the signatories. The message was clear. Abu Dhabi would not tolerate any organised opposition, and the UAE would not become one of the Arab Spring states.
In the spring of 2012, the authorities arrested dozens of members of al-Islah. By the end of the year, the figure had reached approximately ninety-four individuals linked to the association. Sixty-nine were then brought to trial in what became known as the UAE 94 case. Prosecutors charged the detainees with forming a clandestine organisation to overthrow the system of governance in coordination with external entities, which the authorities said referred to the international Muslim Brotherhood organisation. The state released audio and video recordings of meetings between al-Islah leaders and young Emirati members and sympathisers that included threats of confrontation with the authorities.
Courts handed down prison sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years. The authorities stated that they had uncovered a military wing within the organisation and a plan to establish an Islamic caliphate in the UAE. The defendants denied the allegations. At the same time, state media arms launched an intensive campaign against the Brotherhood, portraying it as treacherous, aligned with foreign interests, and intent on demolishing the state. By November 2014, the government had designated the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Islah as terrorist organisations. The cumulative effect of these stringent measures significantly curtailed, and in many cases ended, Islamist activity. Members either fell silent or left the country. Those who departed later established rights-focused groups in Turkey and the United Kingdom that challenged the Emirati authorities and argued that the measures were abusive and that the convicted did not receive fair trials.
The UAE succeeded in imposing its view. Today, Brotherhood organisations are suppressed or on the run across most Gulf states and in Egypt, a situation that owes much to Abu Dhabi’s efforts. The Brotherhood persists in the political scene in countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait, yet it now operates with caution and diminished strength amid a regional wave of pressure against it.
Political Dimensions: Regional and Strategic Interests
Emirati officials consistently state that the Muslim Brotherhood represents the most dangerous long-term threat to state security and regional stability. As a result, the United Arab Emirates classifies political Islam in all its variants as a direct adversary and places it on a threat level comparable to traditional foes. This perception is reflected clearly in post-2011 policy, when the UAE strongly backed Arab regimes opposed to the Brotherhood such as Egypt, and supported military figures who confronted Islamists such as Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya.
Abu Dhabi views the transnational nature of the Muslim Brotherhood as a multiplier of risk. The movement’s rise to power in Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya enables it to strengthen the position of its networks and affiliates across other Arab states, including the UAE. In this context, Abu Dhabi recalibrated its regional alliances after 2011 and moved closer to Saudi Arabia, especially after a new leadership emerged in Riyadh that appeared more aligned with its approach. Although the UAE had historically been the junior partner to Saudi Arabia, the ascent of President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan turned it into a proactive actor that pressed for joint and decisive action.
After 2013, an Emirati-Saudi-Egyptian axis formed with the aim of containing the ambitions of political-Islam forces in the region. This axis led major initiatives, including the intervention in Yemen against the Houthis in 2015 and the blockade of Qatar in 2017. The UAE also sought to deepen its ties with major powers, above all the United States, which it regards as the most important international ally and the genuine guarantor of Gulf security. The continuity of Abu Dhabi’s close alignment with Washington was tested by several divergences during President Barack Obama’s tenure, including differences over the Arab Spring and Iran. The UAE, together with partners such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, felt abandoned during the Arab Spring, since Washington appeared to accept the Brotherhood’s ascent in Egypt and Tunisia. This experience led Emiratis to conclude that confronting the Brotherhood and political-Islam movements should be driven by their own efforts rather than by reliance on a changeable Washington.
Relations between the United States and the UAE improved markedly during the first Trump administration, which shared Abu Dhabi’s view of Islamists and Iran. The UAE managed to rival Qatar’s influence in Washington and became one of the key partners in United States Middle East policy alongside Saudi Arabia and Israel. In parallel, relations with Turkey and Qatar deteriorated sharply after 2011, as Abu Dhabi positioned itself against Ankara and Doha, both of which backed Brotherhood-aligned currents in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. The dispute with Qatar culminated in the severing of relations and the blockade in 2017 with Saudi, Egyptian, and Bahraini participation, since the UAE saw Doha’s permissive approach toward the Brotherhood as a direct threat to regional stability.
After 2011, the UAE adopted a comprehensive strategy to confront the spread of Islamists. This strategy combined political, economic, media, and direct security tools. Diplomatically and militarily, Abu Dhabi did not hesitate to intervene beyond its borders to curb the Brotherhood and its allies. In Egypt, the UAE supported the removal of Brotherhood rule in mid-2013 and provided extensive financial assistance to the post 3 July order to secure the consolidation of power, which made Cairo a pivotal ally in the campaign against political Islam. In Tunisia, the UAE funded and provided media support to secular forces such as Nidaa Tounes to counter the influence of Ennahda, which affiliates with the Brotherhood. In Libya, the UAE engaged militarily through air and logistical support to the forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, whom it viewed as opposed to Islamists aligned with the Tripoli government. Abu Dhabi’s goal was to prevent the emergence of a Libyan government in which the Brotherhood or its close allies would play a leading role. In Yemen, the UAE joined the military coalition against the Houthis while simultaneously opposing the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, known as Islah and linked to the Brotherhood, within the anti-Houthi camp. This produced fundamental differences with its Saudi ally.
The UAE categorised political-Islam groups of all stripes as extremist, regardless of whether they embraced violence. It grounded this stance in the view that renouncing or adopting violence is a tactical choice rather than a principled position. In November 2014, the UAE published a list of terrorist organisations that, alongside Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, included several non-violent Islamic organisations in Europe and the United States, identified as components of the Brotherhood’s wider network. These steps revealed a clear desire to present the UAE internationally as a front-rank partner in the fight against terrorism and extremism. They won sympathy and support from some international powers.
In sum, the UAE sees its regional interests as requiring an Arab environment free of the threat posed by political Islam and by the efforts of Islamist groups to reach power. It has therefore relied on strong alliances with regimes opposed to the Brotherhood and with global powers to preserve the status quo, while adopting a proactive and offensive approach toward political-Islam movements across the region.
Religious Dimensions: An Ideological Stance and Policies to Regulate Islamic Discourse
The UAE advances an Islamic discourse that opposes and counters the project of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Emirati leadership views the politicisation of religion as an intellectual and social danger that threatens the identity of the state and its governing method. The rulers derive their legitimacy from tribal, historical, and constitutional foundations. Most forces of political Islam therefore describe the Emirati government and allied Arab governments as apostate or as clients of the West because these governments do not implement Islamic law. Abu Dhabi believes that any popular adoption of ideas that question its legitimacy creates a serious path toward undermining rule. The UAE therefore works to restrict the spread of Islamist thought domestically and to confront it. Emirati leaders consider the Brotherhood an open gateway to extremism and to the use of violence. An Emirati official has likened the movement to a narcotic that opens the road to extremism.
In contrast to the narrative promoted by political-Islam movements, the UAE promotes a narrative of traditional and moderate Islam that is linked to official and classical religious institutions. To reinforce this narrative, Abu Dhabi built close relationships with major institutions such as Al-Azhar in Egypt and provided media platforms for religious figures who adopt critical stances toward the Brotherhood and militant Islamist groups. The UAE also hosted the Mauritanian scholar Abdullah bin Bayyah, known for a reconciliatory approach distant from political Islam, to chair the UAE Council for Sharia Fatwa and to contribute to the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, which the UAE launched in 2014. In July 2014, Abu Dhabi announced the establishment of the Muslim Council of Elders under the chairmanship of the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar and with scholars from multiple countries. The aim was to unify efforts to confront extremist ideologies.
The UAE adopted several initiatives to advance a discourse of moderate and tolerant Islam. These included convening an annual conference since 2014 to promote peace in Muslim societies and supporting the Marrakesh Declaration on the rights of religious minorities in 2016. The government appointed a Minister of Tolerance in 2016 and facilitated the construction of temples and churches on state-granted land to serve resident communities. As a culmination of this approach, the UAE invited Pope Francis for a historic visit in February 2019, the first visit by a pope to the Arabian Peninsula, during which the Document on Human Fraternity was signed in Abu Dhabi by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar and the pope. All of these steps form part of the UAE’s attempt to present itself as an oasis of religious tolerance in a region riven by waves of extremism and violence.
Domestically, the UAE adopted strict policies to regulate religious activity so that it remains within personal devotional practice and does not intersect with politics or loyalty to the state. The government strictly prohibits the exploitation of religion in politics or the use of religion to criticise the system of rule. It also restricts religious lessons and sermons to approved institutions. The authorities criminalise unlicensed fundraising or religious activities on the grounds that such activities can serve as a cover for unlawful operations. The state monitors online content, and state-owned telecommunications companies block websites that promote an oppositional Islamist discourse or that the authorities classify as extremist.
In parallel, the state promotes depoliticised models of individual and spiritual religiosity. It encourages citizens to pursue religious practices stripped of political content, such as Quran competitions and official charitable events, all within a framework of loyalty to the state.
Economic Dimensions: Political Security and the Stability of the Investment Climate
For the UAE, stability is a necessary precondition for the continuity of its economic model, which it holds up as a regional benchmark. For decades, the state has pursued economic openness and diversification in order to attract foreign investment and global expertise and to build a regional financial, tourism, and trade hub.
This strategy has delivered high growth rates and diversified the economy away from oil. The model is highly sensitive to political or security disruptions. Emirati leaders understand that the rise of political-Islam movements harms the country’s reputation as a safe and stable place for business. If foreign investors, tourists, and visitors sense political tension or Islamic-branded opposition that could escalate into protests or violence, they lose confidence in the UAE as a stable and promising environment.
Political security therefore intersects directly with the UAE’s economic interests. A firm conviction has taken hold that domestic and regional stability is the only reliable guarantee for the continued inflow of capital and skilled residents. The state’s policy of religious tolerance and its confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood are linked in a strategic way to the open economic model the country has chosen. Countering Brotherhood ideology is not only a security measure. It is an urgent economic necessity.
The UAE applies this economic lens beyond its borders to protect its overseas investments, since it is one of the largest international investors in mega energy projects and in port management at the regional and global levels. Political upheavals and civil wars that are fed by political-Islam forces in the region can harm Emirati capital abroad. For the UAE, the political and military disorder in Libya and the rise of Islamist militias threaten the interests of DP World in North Africa, which contributed to Abu Dhabi’s decision to intervene.
The UAE also seeks to secure international sea lanes from the Gulf to the Red Sea and East Africa by ensuring influence over ports in order to keep trade flowing without the control of hostile actors. Curbing the role of the Brotherhood and political-Islam groups such as the Houthis in countries including Yemen, Somalia, and Libya forms part of this vision to protect maritime trade routes.
Political stability gives the UAE weight in energy and financial markets and allows it to focus on long-term development projects without fear of domestic or regional disruption. The state views the spread of political-Islam influence as a threat to the investment climate. The threat can be direct through the promotion of an ideology that opposes an open economic model, which unsettles investors, or indirect through the creation of security and political disturbances that frighten investors and impede trade routes and financial flows. Protecting the economy has therefore been a decisive factor in the UAE’s resolve and its leading role in confronting the Brotherhood and political-Islam forces after 2011.
Conclusion
The UAE’s acute sensitivity toward the Muslim Brotherhood is understandable when the historical, political, religious, and economic dimensions are viewed as a whole. The rulers believe that their state is built on a modern, economically open, religiously moderate, and politically closed model, and that the project of the Brotherhood and of other political-Islam movements, at home and abroad, poses a strategic threat to the core of the state, to its sovereignty, to its stability, and to its economic interests.
Abu Dhabi fears that a regional rise of Islamists would unsettle its internal equilibrium and trigger a contagion of political change. This fear drove the construction of extensive regional and international alliances intended to contain the influence of political Islam and to maintain the dominance of systems that share the same stance toward Islamist currents.
On the religious and intellectual level, the UAE adopts a clear policy that separates religion from politics and presents itself as a model of moderation and religious tolerance. It depicts Islamists as extremists beyond the boundaries of religious centrism. To consolidate this image, the state deploys its soft power and media arms and relies on traditional religious institutions such as Al-Azhar and on initiatives that promote tolerance and interfaith dialogue.
On the economic level, the leadership recognises the close linkage between political security and economic stability. Any expansion of Brotherhood influence or the emergence of political disruptions driven by this current can erode the confidence of investors and international partners in the UAE as a safe and stable regional hub. Eliminating the influence of Islamists has been integral to the strategy to sustain economic growth, protect overseas investments, and safeguard international reputation.
Historically, post-2011 policy can be read as the natural outgrowth of a long struggle with the Brotherhood that reached a climax during the Arab Spring. Abu Dhabi seized an opportunity to settle that struggle in a decisive way, supported by a favourable regional climate and by a firm domestic political will personified by President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. These factors together explain the UAE’s firm stance against the Brotherhood and Islamist organisations since 2011. The stance is, at its core, a defence of a distinct political and social model chosen to secure domestic stability and to expand regional and international influence. Abu Dhabi has largely succeeded in imposing this model, though at a high cost. The UAE has become a declared adversary and a priority target for Islamist groups and their political messaging. The policy toward political Islam therefore reflects both the state’s legitimate pursuit of security and development and its acceptance of a long, difficult, and costly struggle.
Sources
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• Andrew Chappell. Al Jazeera English. Abu Dhabi’s problem with the Muslim Brotherhood. aljazeera.comaljazeera.com. Published in May 2018.
• Chatham House. Jane Kinninmont. Threat perceptions in the UAE’s foreign and security policy. chathamhouse.orgchathamhouse.org. Published in July 2020.
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