The Gulf Cooperation Council states constitute a geostrategic theater of paramount importance for Israeli intelligence services, foremost among them the external intelligence service Mossad and the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Israel Defense Forces known as Aman.
Historically, there has been little record of direct confrontation between Israel and the Gulf states. In recent years, however, strategic shifts have made Mossad activity in the Gulf an option of choice for Tel Aviv. The shared confrontation with Iran has driven the security convergence witnessed between some Gulf states and Israel. At the same time, sensitive issues such as the refusal of states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait to normalize relations, Gulf backing for a two-state solution, the reluctance of Gulf capitals to enter into any direct confrontation with Tehran, and other factors together form a fertile and highly significant terrain for Israeli espionage.
Over the past decade, Mossad has markedly refined its methods and operations to penetrate numerous frontline states as well as countries that Tel Aviv classifies as hostile. In practice, even Israel’s allies such as the United States and the United Kingdom have served as arenas for Mossad activity.
In the Gulf, Mossad operations take two distinct forms. The first is overt and cooperative, especially after the normalization accords known as the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. One example is the statement by former Bahraini Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa during the Munich Security Conference in February 2022, where he affirmed that there is intelligence cooperation between Bahrain and Israel and that Mossad is present in Bahrain and active in the region. The second form, which is the focus of this report, comprises clandestine and hostile operations conducted in line with Israel’s security interests.
Drawing on its record of operations and accumulated experience, this report reviews the principal methods employed by Mossad over the past ten years and then anticipates the agency’s likely behavior in the Gulf in the coming years. It also analyzes the potential targets of Mossad and Aman in the Gulf, the avenues of penetration and recruitment they may rely on, the security vulnerabilities through which they can gain access, and the overall susceptibility of Gulf states to infiltration.
Operating Patterns and Methods
Over the past decade, Mossad has strengthened cooperation with certain regional and international intelligence services based on shared interests against common adversaries. Reporting points to a close partnership between Mossad and India’s external intelligence service Research and Analysis Wing that produced the Indian network in the Gulf described above. The roots of this partnership date back to cooperation during the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. Security coordination between Israel and some Gulf states has also grown. Even before formal normalization, Mossad officials were frequent visitors to certain Gulf capitals. The service provided these states with precise and actionable information on politicians, activists, and journalists linked to Islamist movements including the Muslim Brotherhood and Shia groups, and oversaw the provision of surveillance and intrusion technologies that proved highly persuasive to Gulf security services.
The exchange of technical and security expertise required bringing Israeli cybersecurity companies into the Gulf and hiring Israeli experts, including retired officers, in Emirati firms. This cooperation gave Mossad an official foothold inside Gulf states and a channel for gathering sensitive information outside the framework of its partnerships with Gulf security and intelligence agencies. Mossad also benefited from Israeli technology firms that supplied several Gulf countries with spyware such as the Pegasus platform. Some analytical assessments suggest that Gulf states may have inadvertently granted Mossad access to data collected by these tools through backdoors that allowed information to flow to Israel. There is no publicly available proof of misuse. The context, however, is an intelligence environment in which all methods are on the table.
Special Operations
Mossad has a reputation for bold action. Its record includes operations targeting Iran’s nuclear program and Iranian nuclear scientists, acts of sabotage against Iranian facilities, and the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.
Mossad relies on local agents inside target countries and on smuggling explosive devices across borders. In the Gulf, and in Qatar in particular, the agency appears poised to consider kidnappings or assassinations against Hamas figures residing there. It would draw on prior experience operating with high secrecy inside Gulf cities just as it did in Dubai in 2010.
Mossad Objectives in the Gulf States
First: Tracking and monitoring in the conflict with Iran
Iran is Israel’s primary security concern, and Mossad is on the front line of efforts to follow Tehran’s activities. The Gulf, given its proximity to Iran and its often tense relationships with it, is a key arena for monitoring Iranian movements. In cooperation with some Gulf services, Mossad is expected to collect as much information on Iran as possible. Acting independently and outside bilateral frameworks, it will seek to track any political, military, or economic cooperation between Gulf states and Iran. Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia will be under particular scrutiny.
Mossad is also expected to watch Iranian support for the Houthi movement in Yemen and to monitor the activities of Iran’s armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Gulf waters. Western intelligence reporting points to Israeli concern about Gulf military projects with Iranian or Chinese fingerprints, including the new spaceport project in Oman that Israeli spy satellites are watching out of fear it could be used for military purposes that benefit Iran. Strengthening technical surveillance and recruiting local sources inside Gulf states to follow Iranian activities will be high priorities.
Second: Espionage against quasi-adversarial states
Qatar and Oman were the first Gulf states to normalize a limited form of relations with Israel in 1996 through interests sections. Today, Tel Aviv’s relationships with Muscat and Doha are at a low ebb. The Gaza war of October 2023 was a turning point. Israel accuses Qatar of offering safe haven to Hamas leaders and supporting the group through the Al Jazeera network, whose offices Israel shut down. Qatar justifies hosting Hamas leaders as a response to a United States request that facilitates negotiations and it continues to voice strong opposition to Israel’s war on Gaza. Oman’s firm stance during the war was also notable, reflected in the positions of Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi and Grand Mufti Ahmed al-Khalili.
Although both states are important allies of the United States, Israel is unable to classify Qatar and Oman as hostile. Politically, in the media, and by necessity in intelligence terms, it treats them as quasi-adversarial.
Oman and Qatar are therefore likely to be major theaters for Mossad operations that target sovereign, political, economic, security, and intelligence circles and that track Hamas leaders based in Qatar.
On 15 July 2024, the Imam Ali Mosque in the Wadi Kabir district of Muscat witnessed a terrorist attack when three Omani brothers opened fire on Shia worshipers inside and outside the mosque. Six people were killed including a police officer, and between 28 and 50 were injured. The Islamic State claimed responsibility. Unofficial reports nevertheless described an ambiguous timing that some read as a hint of possible Mossad involvement.
Third: Gulf armament and military technology programs
Gulf states do not pose a direct military threat to Israel. Tel Aviv nonetheless monitors any military development in the region that could affect its qualitative edge. This was evident in the case of the Qatari submarine project, which Israel viewed as a potential threat. It was recently revealed that Mossad spied on the project through Indian operatives who provided secret information on Qatari plans to acquire Italian submarines. Israel has strongly opposed the sale of F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia, arguing that such sales would erode Israel’s air superiority, and pressed Washington to reduce certain capabilities including range and strike power. The same pattern was visible when Israel resisted Gulf acquisition of F-35 stealth fighters even after the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020.
Mossad will likely monitor Saudi programs to develop ballistic missiles and drones. It is also expected to eavesdrop on the defense ministries of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar and on their military-industrial organizations. The aim is to pre-empt any shift that could upset the regional military balance.
Civil nuclear energy projects that could pave the way to future nuclear capabilities will also come under watch through espionage, satellite imagery, internal documents, and conversations among experts involved in these programs.
Fourth: Disrupting funding to factions hostile to Israel
Israel views with suspicion the relationships that some Gulf states maintain with certain Palestinian factions and Islamist groups that Israel designates as hostile. Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman stand out in this regard.
Likely Mossad objectives include espionage against sovereign ministries in Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman and surveillance of financial and media networks tied to those factions inside the Gulf. The service is expected to plant agents inside banks, financial institutions, and money-transfer companies in these states to monitor transactions and to intercept communications between faction leaders and sympathizers. Iran has previously been accused of trying to exploit Bahrain and Kuwait to smuggle weapons to aligned cells. Mossad therefore has a strong interest in tracking and disrupting such activity in concert with local services or through covert action.
Mossad is also expected to spy on charities and social institutions in these states and to watch their financial flows and their networks of supporters, including business elites.
Fifth: Shaping normalization decisions and intelligence deception
At the political level, Mossad will seek to gauge the intentions of Gulf decision-makers toward Israel and to track alliances and the trajectory of Gulf foreign policies. It will also try to influence those choices in ways that secure Israeli interests.
The prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization is the crown jewel of intelligence interest for Israel’s political leadership and for Mossad. The agency is likely to probe the views of royal circles and the security establishment in Saudi Arabia regarding normalization in order to provide regular and reliable assessments to Israeli decision-makers on how to persuade Riyadh and on the points of reservation within the Saudi system.
In parallel, Mossad will try to deepen security ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to anchor the new alignment. These tasks have gained importance after the recent Saudi-Iranian rapprochement brokered by China. Mossad will work behind the scenes to expose any Iranian designs that target the Gulf and to pass them to Gulf partners with the aim of spoiling or slowing the détente. This may include delivering information and reports on Iran, China, or Islamist movements that are false or misleading. The strategic objective is to keep Gulf states closer to Israel than to its adversaries through a blend of vital security information and warnings that mix accurate content with deception.
Sixth: Protecting Israeli missions and interests
Like all states that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, Mossad is tasked with safeguarding Israeli facilities, political figures, and private citizens in the Gulf.
Any security threat to Israelis, diplomats, or businesspeople in Gulf states falls within Mossad’s remit, whether in coordination with host governments or in spite of them. The service will collect information on extremist Islamist cells and on hostile individuals or groups that might plan to target Israelis. It is expected to monitor Arab and Iranian communities in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to identify actors who may be preparing attacks.
Mossad will also work to secure Israeli technology platforms operating in the Gulf against intrusion in order to protect Israeli investments and facilitate their activity. Any internal information that flows to Mossad in the course of protecting these institutions and individuals will in turn be used to advance the objectives outlined above.
Expected Penetration and Recruitment Methods
Mossad is likely to rely on a mix of conventional and innovative penetration tools adapted to the specific characteristics of the Gulf states. The most prominent expected methods of penetration and recruitment are as follows:
Foreign labor
Gulf countries host vast expatriate communities that form a significant share of the workforce, including millions of arrivals from South Asia, Arabs, Europeans, and others. This environment provides Mossad with an excellent human cover through which it can infiltrate. As explained earlier, Mossad leveraged the Indian espionage network in Iran and the Gulf to employ dozens of Indian nationals working on sensitive projects in support of Indian and Israeli intelligence.
Mossad is expected to continue recruiting migrant workers in states such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Given the low wages of many of these workers, financial inducements will be used to draw them into direct espionage or to plant intrusion software on electronic devices at their workplaces. It is also plausible that some Arabs residing in the Gulf will be recruited, since it was previously announced that Mossad recruited Jordanian nationals who traveled to Saudi Arabia for the minor pilgrimage in 2018 to carry out espionage agendas.
Commercial activity and advanced technologies
All Gulf states are steadily simplifying the requirements for establishing international companies in order to attract investment. Commercial firms thus form an important gateway for penetration.
Mossad is expected to push consulting companies across multiple specialties, staffed by Israelis or by Mossad assets, to operate in the Gulf. Beyond the legitimate services these firms will provide as cover, they will serve as platforms for information gathering.
In recent years, the Emirati cybersecurity company DarkMatter hired Israeli experts who graduated from the cyber Unit 8200. The presence of these Israeli cadres inside Gulf communications and information systems grants Israel a promising opportunity for deep access, and possibly for installing invisible listening mechanisms within critical infrastructure. Private firms have also been documented acting as recruitment fronts, such as the Dhara company in Qatar, which turned out to be a cover for espionage activity that employed Indian officers who were later charged with spying before their arrest. Mossad is likely to encourage joint commercial partnerships and shared investments between Israelis and Gulf nationals to establish a legitimate foothold. It may also continue to develop software exported to Gulf states in fields such as cybersecurity and smart-city systems.
Penetrating national intelligence and security services
Despite the professionalism of Gulf intelligence services, Mossad may seek to recruit individuals within these agencies or to build special relationship networks that provide it with inside information. This could occur by targeting Gulf intelligence officers while they are abroad for study or on assignment and attempting to cultivate ties with them.
In states such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, it has recently become possible for senior security officials and officers to communicate openly with their Israeli counterparts, which may open the door to covert individualized cultivation. If direct recruitment proves difficult, Mossad may substitute by intercepting the communications and documents of these officers and by subjecting them to personal surveillance.
Diplomatic and tourism cover
Israeli intelligence services often place their officers under diplomatic cover in embassies and missions. Embassy staff in Gulf states can therefore be expected to include Mossad operatives who collect information within the bounds allowed to diplomats and who liaise with nationals of other countries on the host state’s soil.
As Gulf states open up to issuing tourist visas to Israeli citizens, the number of Israeli entries for tourism or trade is likely to increase. This creates a possibility for agents to enter as businesspeople or experts. A Mossad operative with dual European nationality can readily arrive as a specialist with an international company and hold meetings with Gulf officials or citizens without arousing suspicion. Smooth integration into the local environment will be a primary tool for collection and inquiry.
Remote technical surveillance and signals intelligence
Israel is expected to continue exploiting its technical superiority to monitor communications and electronic emissions across the Gulf at a distance. Mossad and other Israeli intelligence bodies field advanced constellations of satellites and reconnaissance aircraft capable of intercepting communications signals.
Tel Aviv is likely to intensify the deployment of spy satellites oriented toward the Gulf in order to monitor military bases, ports, and emerging infrastructure sites such as Oman’s Duqm port project, as well as nuclear reactors and arms plants in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These technologies provide Mossad with a steady flow of data that may reduce the need for human agents on the ground except for field confirmation. Since some Gulf states have acquired Israeli defense systems such as radars, drone interception platforms, or even phone surveillance technologies, Israel may be able to obtain data directly from those systems and tools. It is noteworthy that in 2022 the United Arab Emirates purchased a number of SPYDER surface-to-air missile systems produced by Rafael.
Outlook and recommendations
The foregoing indicates that Gulf states will face an increasingly complex intelligence and security landscape in the coming years, driven in particular by Mossad’s extensive entry into the Gulf arena.
Despite the remarkable progress Gulf states have achieved in technology and infrastructure, they face structural and security gaps that leave them vulnerable to systematic penetration. The main vulnerabilities that Mossad may exploit can be summarized as follows:
• Heavy reliance on foreign labor, especially in sensitive sectors such as telecommunications, energy and defense. This creates a fertile environment for intelligence infiltration amid large expatriate communities that are difficult to monitor closely.
• Shortcomings in cybersecurity. Most Gulf states rely on international cloud services, which opens digital windows for espionage and cyber sabotage. Dependence on foreign labor within communications infrastructure adds to the ease with which systems and personnel can be penetrated and recruited.
• Divergent capabilities among Gulf intelligence services. There is a significant gap in experience and competence between larger states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and less security-engaged states such as Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. This provides Mossad with environments that are less sensitive and less risky in which to operate.
• Rapid investment and tourism liberalization. Accelerated openness provides ideal cover for foreign intelligence officers, especially given broad licensing regimes and the proliferation of free commercial and media zones.
• Country-specific internal factors. Political rifts or sectarian tensions within Gulf states create opportunities for targeted espionage that focuses on decision-making circles or on core societal structures.
In light of this, Mossad is likely to remain an active player in the Gulf, acting at times as a security partner for some states and as a hidden adversary for others. The effectiveness of this role will depend on the vigilance and preparedness of Gulf governments and on their ability to build joint security networks capable of detecting and validating threats. Accordingly, this report recommends the following:
• Strengthen security and intelligence coordination. Gulf states should deepen intra-Gulf coordination to identify suspicious movements early and to respond promptly, especially given the rapid mobility of individuals and communities across their borders.
• Tighten control over the hiring of foreign nationals. This is essential in vital economic sectors, telecommunications infrastructure, and defense institutions. It should be paired with stricter background vetting and updated regulations for residence permits and commercial licenses.
• Raise cybersecurity proficiency. This should include modernizing protection systems, especially in sovereign installations such as banks, energy networks, and telecommunications, and enforcing robust security checks on technology contracts with foreign firms.
• Reassess tourism and investment openness. Gulf states should review these policies through a security lens and integrate intelligence risk assessments into licensing for new companies with rigorous verification of their activities and nature.
• Build a unified intelligence doctrine. Gulf states should adopt a realistic approach to Mossad that rests not only on caution and suspicion but also on anticipating its moves and dismantling its flexible methods that target structures rather than direct confrontation.
• Defuse internal and regional crises. A stable environment is largely inert from an intelligence standpoint, which reduces incentives for Israeli involvement in espionage against Gulf states. Easing internal tensions, resolving disputes among Gulf capitals, and lowering the temperature in relations with Iran would all diminish the demand for agents and shadow networks. Until such conditions prevail, the Gulf will remain a space of overlapping interests and penetrations, and its states must exercise vigilance and balance to safeguard national security amid fast-moving and difficult changes.
