Ankara has backed armed factions and expanded its influence in northern Syria under various pretexts, including combating Kurdish militias and curbing refugee flows into Turkey. For years, Turkey served as the gateway for massive arms shipments that ended up in the hands of opposition fighters and facilitated the movement of tens of thousands of foreign and Arab combatants. Today, Turkey is arguably the most influential power in Damascus, shaping Syria’s political trajectory.
Turkey now finds itself in a decisive role, positioning itself as a key partner of the new government. However, this could strain its relations with regional and global powers wary of Ankara leveraging its influence to further its own agenda—one centered on supporting Islamist groups and expanding Turkey’s economic and political footprint. Countries such as Iraq, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are particularly concerned about this shift.
While Turkey aims to establish itself as the primary protector of the new Syrian regime, it faces significant challenges, including internal strife among armed factions and mounting regional and international interventions. Moreover, Turkey’s growing footprint in Syria is raising alarm in Washington and Tel Aviv, which see Ankara’s actions as a threat to their strategic interests.
Turkish Influence: Gains and Challenges
Ankara has backed armed factions and expanded its influence in northern Syria under various pretexts, including combating Kurdish militias and curbing refugee flows into Turkey. For years, Turkey served as the gateway for massive arms shipments that ended up in the hands of opposition fighters and facilitated the movement of tens of thousands of foreign and Arab combatants. Today, Turkey is arguably the most influential power in Damascus, shaping Syria’s political trajectory.
Turkey now finds itself in a decisive role, positioning itself as a key partner of the new government. However, this could strain its relations with regional and global powers wary of Ankara leveraging its influence to further its own agenda—one centered on supporting Islamist groups and expanding Turkey’s economic and political footprint. Countries such as Iraq, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are particularly concerned about this shift.
While Turkey aims to establish itself as the primary protector of the new Syrian regime, it faces significant challenges, including internal strife among armed factions and mounting regional and international interventions. Moreover, Turkey’s growing footprint in Syria is raising alarm in Washington and Tel Aviv, which see Ankara’s actions as a threat to their strategic interests.
U.S. and Israeli Concerns
Washington and Tel Aviv view the rise of the new Syrian government with unease. Israeli analysts have repeatedly described it as “Islamist and extremist,” while U.S. officials worry that such a regime could jeopardize American interests, provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups, and destabilize neighboring countries.
Despite these concerns, the U.S. has yet to take an openly hostile stance. Instead, Washington appears to be testing a strategy of engagement rather than confrontation.
For Israel, the new Syrian leadership represents a potential safe haven for hostile groups. Having successfully weakened Iran’s influence in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, Tel Aviv is determined to prevent armed Islamist factions and Turkey from capitalizing on its strategic gains. As a preemptive measure, Israel has expanded its territorial control in Syria, securing strategic access to southern Lebanon while reinforcing its borders. So far, Damascus has refrained from direct confrontation with Israel, a stance that has sparked criticism both inside and outside Syria.
Gulf States: Diverging Approaches
Syria has become a complex battleground for Gulf states seeking to counterbalance Turkish and Israeli influence. While Gulf nations supported the Syrian opposition in the early years of the uprising, they now face a vastly different reality that requires recalibrated strategies.
The Gulf’s position is fragmented. Qatar has aligned itself closely with Turkey, emerging as one of the staunchest backers of the new Syrian leadership. This was evident in Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s visit to Damascus—the first Arab leader to do so after Assad’s fall. Qatar Airways has also resumed direct flights to Damascus, underscoring Doha’s commitment to normalizing ties with the new government. However, Qatar remains hesitant to provide direct financial aid, awaiting the lifting of sanctions on Syria to avoid renewed accusations of financing Islamist groups.
In contrast, the UAE and Bahrain have adopted a more cautious stance. While Abu Dhabi formally acknowledged Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership, it remains reluctant to extend political or financial support. This aligns with the UAE’s broader foreign policy, which prioritizes curbing the influence of political Islam. Notably, Egypt and Iraq share the UAE’s reservations, making this cautious approach a significant counterweight in shaping Syria’s future.
Saudi Arabia, along with Oman and Kuwait, has taken a more pragmatic approach—more engaged than the UAE but less enthusiastic than Qatar. Riyadh was the first Gulf capital al-Sharaa visited in February 2025, signaling Saudi Arabia’s role in granting him regional legitimacy. However, Saudi support will likely depend on securing tangible political and economic leverage within Syria’s new power structure.
Conclusions
Syria’s political landscape will remain volatile for years to come. Internal conflicts, factional violence, and external interventions will continue to shape the country’s trajectory. The survival of the new government depends largely on Turkish and Qatari support, the cohesion of allied factions, and Damascus’ ability to manage key challenges—including its relations with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Druze community, and lingering tensions with the Alawites.
For the Gulf states, expanding their influence in Syria requires a flexible strategy that balances political pressure, economic investment, and active diplomacy. If they can position themselves as reliable partners in stabilizing Syria, they may secure a lasting foothold while mitigating the risks associated with an Islamist-led government. However, this will inevitably lead to confrontations—or, at times, alignments—with Turkey and Israel.
President al-Sharaa will struggle to balance Gulf interests—particularly those of Saudi Arabia—against dominant Turkish influence in Syria. At some point, he may have no choice but to lean further toward Ankara. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to provide generous support without guarantees of real influence within Syria’s new power structure.
The prospect of rogue Islamist factions escalating their operations remains a serious concern. Should this occur, a decisive American and Israeli intervention could drag Syria into a full-scale war with disastrous consequences. From a regional perspective, the UAE, Iraq, Egypt, and potentially Jordan share a common stance: allowing an Islamist-led government to take hold in Syria is a strategic mistake that must be avoided at all costs.
