The Shiite religious authority (marjiʿiyah; reference) stands as one of the most important religious institutions in the Islamic world, particularly within the Twelver Shiite tradition.
Based in the prominent religious centers of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran, this authority plays a major role in the lives of millions of Shiites around the world, including Shiite citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. However, the relationship between the Shiite religious authority and the Gulf states is complex and fraught with challenges and uncertainties, particularly in light of the ongoing regional tensions between Iran and the Gulf states.
This report seeks to analyze the dynamics of this relationship by addressing several key questions, focusing on political, security and religious dimensions.
Does the Shiite religious authority pose a security threat to the stability of the Gulf States?
The relationship between the Shiite religious authority and the GCC countries is multifaceted, shaped by a convergence of religious, political, and security considerations.
This question does not lend itself to a definitive answer, as the security threat varies according to the political and regional context on the one hand, and the religious and ritual context on the other.
Iranian Policy: At times, the Shiite religious authority is leveraged as a vehicle to extend Iranian influence across the region. Iran, positioning itself as the guardian of Shiites worldwide and the state that represents and defends their interests, employs religious discourse to justify its interventions in countries like Yemen (by supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah) and Bahrain (by backing the Shiite opposition). These factions draw on Shiite religious authority (marjiʿiyah) to legitimize their political and military activities, which raises concerns among Gulf states that religious authority could be instrumentalized to undermine internal stability.
Independent Authorities: Conversely, there are independent Shia religious leaders, such as Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani in Najaf, who adopt a moderate discourse and reject the idea of “exporting the Iranian revolution.” The traditional clerical establishment in Najaf oppose interference in the political affairs of other countries and advocate for moderation and dialogue rather than confrontation. Al-Sistani, for example, played a pivotal role in calming the situation in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003, calling for national unity and denouncing sectarian violence.
Therefore, the security threat associated with the Shiite religious authority is not inherently religious, but rather political in nature—rooted in the degree to which Iran capitalizes on sectarian ties between Shiite citizens and the marjiʿiyah to advance its geopolitical interests. As such, the perceived threat is contingent on the broader political and regional context, rather than the religious doctrine itself.
Should Shiite citizens have religious authorities in Iran and Iraq?
In the absence of local religious authorities, Shiite citizens in the Gulf countries turn to religious leaders in Iran and Iraq for guidance. Within the Twelver Shiite tradition, followers are religiously obligated to adhere to a living religious authority—a practice known as taqlid. Taqlid (literally means following or imitating) is a jurisprudential system that obliges laypeople to follow the rulings of a specific religious authority on religious matters. The historical religious centers and seminaries, or “hawzas,” in Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran) serve as the principal centers of Shiite scholarship, drawing believers from across the globe. These centers have a long history of intellectual and legal scholarship, which establishes them as trusted reference points for Shiite around the world.
There is no stable or widely recognized Shiite religious institution or seminary (hawza) in the Gulf states. This absence has led to a vacuum in local religious authority (marjiʿiyah), compelling Shiite citizens to turn to external marajiʿ in Iran and Iraq for spiritual and legal guidance. The lack of indigenous marjiʿiyah highlights a broader history of political and social marginalization faced by Shiite communities in certain Gulf countries, as well as prevailing concerns in others that local hawzas could evolve into centers for promoting Shiism.
It is noteworthy that Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were once home to local, yet transnational, Shiite religious authorities whose influence extended beyond their borders. To name a few, Sheikh Youssef Al-Bahrani (1695–1772) and Sheikh Hussein Al-Asfour (d. 1801) held religious authority that reached across much of the Gulf, and their scholarly works remain foundational texts for students in the seminaries of Qom and Najaf today. This phenomenon of transnational marjiʿiyah is not unique to the Gulf, as Shiites around the world consult leading clerics of Iraq and Iran in matters of imitation. Nonetheless, this does not negate the fact that local religious authorities do exist in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries.
What is the difference between a religious authority (marjiʿ) and a guardian jurist (al-Waly al-Faqīh), and is there a consensus on the guardianship of the jurist?
The distinction between a religious authority and a jurist guardian is a fundamental difference in Shiite thought, and has intricate and complex political implications.
A religious authority (marjiʿiyah) is a religious figure who holds authority in jurisprudence and Islamic legal rulings but does not necessarily intervene in political matters. Ayatollah Sistani, for instance, exemplifies this traditional model—exerting considerable influence on public matters in Iraq while largely refraining from direct political involvement.
The Guardian Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih in Persian) in the modern sense is a political theory, with Imam Ayatollah Khomeini being one of its most prominent theorists. This theory combines both religious and political authority. Under Article 5 of the Iranian Constitution, the Guardian Jurist is the supreme leader of the state and holds extensive powers in managing political and military affairs.
This theory of Velayat-e Faqih is yet controversial within the Shiite world. In fact, it is not a product of the Iranian political experience but rather has much older roots. Fundamentally, the existence of religious authority and its engagement with legal rulings, jurisprudence, and judiciary naturally grants it a form of governance or guardianship. This concept was notably advanced by Al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki (d. 940 AH), who argued that the marjiʿiyah acts as a political representative of the Twelfth Imam during his occultation, a central tenet in Shiite belief. Sheikh al-Naraqi (died in 1245 AH) is regarded as the first to explicitly articulate the notion of absolute guardianship of the jurist.
It is worth noting that there is no consensus on the concept of guardianship of the jurist within the Shiite sect. Traditional Najaf clerics such as Ayatollah Khoei rejected the idea of a religious authority possessing absolute power. In contrast, clerics of Qom, like Khomeini, Khamenei, and Makarem Shirazi, upheld this doctrine. Meanwhile, the Shirazi movement (known as the Movement of Vanguard Missionaries) advocates for an alternative model; a council of religious authorities. Thus, Velayat-e Faqih remains a deeply contested concept, dividing Shiite thought between proponents and critics.
Do religious authorities play political roles?
Some Shiite religious authorities have played political roles, but to varying degrees. For example:
Imam Khomeini: Ayatollah Khomeini stands as a prominent example of a religious authority who spearheaded a major political transformation. He led the 1979 Iranian Revolution and established a political system that fused religion and state under the umbrella of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih). Khomeini used religious discourse to mobilize the masses against the Shah’s regime, which led to a radical change in the Iranian political system.
Sayyid Sistani: Ayatollah Sistani played a crucial political role in Iraq in the period after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He intervened to support the ratification of the Iraqi constitution in 2005 and voiced opposition to the American occupation. However, he maintained relative neutrality in day-to-day political affairs.
Opposition marajiʿ: Some religious authorities supported opposition movements in the Gulf States. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad al-Shirazi (died 2001) supported Shiite protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia through his religious speeches. Some Gulf states, including Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, benefited from some interventions by Shiite religious authorities. For example, in 1968, the then Emir of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, visited the Shiite religious authority Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim, a visit that resulted in al-Hakim directing the Shiite citizens in Bahrain to vote for Bahrain’s independence and reject subordination to Iran. The position of the Shiite religious authorities on the invasion of Kuwait is also worth noting.
Does religious authority require loyalty to the country of the authority?
In general, the religious authority (marjiʿiyah) does not require loyalty to the country in which he is based; rather, the majority of the commandments emphasizes the necessity for followers to abide by the laws of their own country. According to Shiite jurisprudence, obedience to the “just ruler” is a religious obligation, but if the ruler is unjust, dissent against him becomes permissible. Most religious authorities, such as Ayatollah Na’ini, call for the separation between religious loyalty and national allegiance.
However, conflicts frequently emerge between fatwas (religious ruling) issued by foreign religious authorities and the laws of local governments—a tension seen in numerous instances. Such disputes have often strained relations between Shiite citizens and state authorities, particularly in Gulf nations, where questions of national identity and sectarian loyalty remain deeply sensitive and contentious.
The question of loyalty to the country of the religious authority intersects with another equally significant issue: the sympathy that Shiite citizens in the Gulf states have for Iran—a country that plays the role of a central Shiite state for Shiites around the world. Gulf states assert that Iran politically capitalizes on this sympathy, which has contributed to the emergence of opposition movements, both political and violent, in some countries, especially Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
Are the Concerns of Gulf States Justified?
The Gulf States’ fears over the influence of Shiite religious authority are undoubtedly valid. However, these concerns often lack a proper understanding of the nature and concept of religious authority (marjiʿiyah) and imitation of certain scholars (taqlid). They may be also exaggerated at times.
Indisputable evidence points to Iran’s attempts to exploit sectarian affiliation to achieve political goal. The case of the so-called “Hezbollah cell” in Kuwait in 2015, for instance, demonstrated how religious and loyalist discourse can be used to recruit individuals for sabotage operations. Similarly, there are instances involving Hezbollah in Bahrain, Hezbollah Al-Hejaz, the uprisings in Bahrain in 2011, and the events in Al-Awamiyah, Saudi Arabia, in 2012.
Shiite elites in the Gulf countries believe that government concerns over the influence of religious authority are sometimes used to justify internal repression against Shiite communities. Additionally, these governments expect their Shiite elites to take a clearer and more decisive stance regarding hostility towards Iran, which occasionally puts those elites in direct confrontation with prominent religious authorities in Iran.
The war in Yemen underscores this dilemma. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and most Gulf countries launched a military campaign against the Houthis (Zaidi Shiites)—an assault that Iran and Shiite clerics consistently opposed. Amidst this contradiction, the majority of Shiite citizens in the Gulf states chose not to endorse or engage positively with the war. As a result, some Gulf governments interpreted this stance as an indication of their Shiite populations siding with an enemy in times of conflict. This problematic situation can also be applied to the Gulf position on Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.
Conclusions
Asserting the possibility for a definitive solution to this intricate issue seems unrealistic. As a matter of fact, addressing it requires a nuanced approach to a complicated process that initially necessitates separating the Shiite religious authority (marjiʿiyah), as part of the Shiite doctrine, and the guardianship of the jurist (Velayat-e Faqih), whether absolute or limited, in the political context.
Strengthening and establishing local religious and seminary institutions: Supporting and investing in religious institutions and seminaries in the Gulf countries could—after decades—lead to the emergence of Gulf (local) religious authorities. Gradually, this will reduce the prevailing reliance on clerical leadership based in Iraq and Iran.
Political reforms: Political reforms tailored to the monarchical systems in the Gulf States while ensuring recognition of societal components, including the Shiites, would effectively contribute to closing any gaps through which Iran could penetrate these communities. A realistic example is Shiites in countries like the Sultanate of Oman, UAE, and Qatar, where external influence over the Shiite components remains notably limited.
Better understanding and national dialogues: Fostering dialogue between Sunnis and Shiites to mitigate sectarian rhetoric and address mutual fears and doubts, as well as allowing conscious dialogue within the Shiite component itself with the aim of raising awareness of the importance of separating imitation (taqlid) and religious authorities (marjiʿiyah) from the governance of local states, would strengthen national identities and sense of belonging, potentially diminishing the influence of sub-religious affiliations.
Gulf and Iranian guarantees: An open and transparent dialogue between the Arab Gulf states and Iran with the aim of charting a course for relations grounded on mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs, and stopping any provocations from both sides, would alleviate the escalating tensions and suspicions between the two camps.
