In 2025, the trajectory of confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv escalated to an unprecedented level, with U.S. involvement reaching its peak through strikes on sensitive Iranian nuclear facilities. This escalation unfolded at a moment when nuclear negotiations had tentatively re-entered circulation, causing military confrontation to intersect directly with a fragile diplomatic track that lacked firm guarantees.
Iran now finds itself under compounded pressure: strategic military strain on one level and deepening socio-economic stress on another. Living conditions are deteriorating rapidly, marked by record inflation, a sustained collapse of the national currency, and shortages of basic goods, all under sanctions that have not been eased and following a war that imposed additional burdens on an already exhausted economy.
Under these conditions, Iran increasingly resembles a wounded state reassessing its priorities—not through voluntary ideological revision, but under the weight of hard constraints. It is within this context that analyses invoking a “paradigm shift” have emerged in internal and regional debates. These analyses point to a transition from an approach grounded in confrontation and threats toward one focused on cooperation, or potentially toward deeper changes in political structures that could extend to modes of governance.
Since late 2024, a discernible change has taken shape within Iran’s political class and elite discourse. This emerging language does not declare a rupture with ideology or the revolutionary narrative, but it increasingly subjects them to cost calculations that have become difficult and damaging. The core argument advanced by this elite is that a gradual shift from a logic of existential conflicts toward one of managing losses and national interests has become necessary.
Hamid Aboutalebi, former deputy foreign minister, warned of what he described as a dangerous illusion among certain hardline circles: the assumption that escalation with the United States would not entail “additional costs.” Such thinking, he argued, could lead Iran toward a “severe setback.”
At a more detailed level, some policymakers have proposed that Tehran approach the Palestinian issue through internationally acceptable frameworks—such as a two-state solution—as a viable path to breaking isolation and easing economic pressure, without rhetorically abandoning Iran’s national or sovereign constants. Hardliners within the power structure, by contrast, point to the Syrian case following the fall of the Assad regime, warning that retreating from explicit hostility toward Washington could produce ambiguous and destabilizing outcomes.
Within Iran’s political-intellectual elite, two principal currents are now apparent. The first advocates disengagement from direct confrontation with Washington and the containment of conflict. This current does not view the United States as a partner, but as a rival whose hostility can be managed at lower cost. It is led by reformists, moderates, and figures from the so-called “old guard” who believe that war with the United States or Israel would entangle Iran in a quagmire from which exit would be difficult.
The second current places the domestic arena at the center of strategic priority and calls for reducing the costs of the “Axis of Resistance.” It does not propose normalization with Israel, nor does it rhetorically abandon support for Palestine. Instead, it argues for curbing external expenditures and avoiding the transformation of regional conflicts into open-ended commitments. From this perspective, Iran currently bears a disproportionate burden in sustaining allies abroad while economic and social pressure intensifies at home. Continuation along this path, proponents argue, threatens not only living standards but the cohesion of the state itself.
Methodology and Selection Criteria
This report does not treat change as an official policy declaration or a formal program. It approaches change as a shift in language, boundaries, and the ceiling of what is politically permissible within the state. On this basis, approximately thirty figures were selected according to the following criteria:
- Institutional position or proximity to power: current and former officials, advisers, parliamentarians, figures from the security and military establishment, or individuals possessing symbolic legitimacy within the system.
- Documented discourse during 2024–2025: statements, articles, interviews, or public interventions addressing the costs of confrontation, the prioritization of domestic concerns, or the management of relations with Washington.
- Ideological diversity: reformists, pragmatic conservatives, economists, academics, journalists, and human rights figures.
- Political significance: what the figure represents within state balances, not merely the sharpness of rhetoric.
The following section presents approximately thirty political and intellectual figures whose positions reflect and support an emerging shift in Iran’s foreign policy debate.
First: Mohammad Javad Zarif (former foreign minister).
Zarif represents the most prominent face of pragmatism within the power structure and remains the leading figure advocating disengagement from open confrontation with the United States. He has consistently argued that direct confrontation with Washington undermines Iran’s national interests and that negotiation constitutes an instrument of power rather than a concession. Zarif does not adopt a discourse calling for withdrawal from the Palestinian issue and maintains the system’s official language. His emphasis, however, lies in prioritizing sanctions relief and economic recovery. His significance does not stem from what he says about Palestine, but from what he advances in practice: positioning relations with Washington as the gateway through which all other files are managed.
Second: Sadegh Zibakalam (professor of political science, Tehran).
A secular intellectual critical of ideological extremism, Zibakalam has warned in public debates that the United States is not the strategic enemy behind all of Iran’s problems and that slogans declaring “America is our enemy” fail to compensate for a genuine strategic vacuum. He has criticized the burning of U.S. and Israeli flags, describing it as a grave mistake that reflects the inability of political discourse to produce rational alternatives. On Palestine, Zibakalam characterizes his support as largely rhetorical. In recent remarks, he has argued that younger generations in Iran increasingly reject traditional positions on Palestine and view Donald Trump as a successful, strong leader.
Third: Mostafa Tajzadeh (former deputy minister and reformist figure).
Currently imprisoned, Tajzadeh is among the most prominent representatives of the “new reformists” and a leading advocate of political freedoms inside Iran. He has not articulated a direct public position on Israel or the United States, but advances a structural approach centered on constitutional reform, reducing external overreach, and re-concentrating authority within civilian institutions. While he does not explicitly call for withdrawal from the Palestinian issue, his political logic is grounded in reordering state priorities and reducing the costs of external polarization.
Fourth: Mohammad Khatami (former reformist president).
A leading figure of the early reformist current, Khatami championed the concept of a “Dialogue of Civilizations” and repeatedly argued that the export of revolution should come to an end. Although he has issued no recent statements since leaving office, he continues to symbolize the aspiration for Iran’s reintegration into the international community in exchange for improved domestic conditions. His traditional position on Palestine emphasized support for legitimate rights through diplomatic and moderate means.
Fifth: Mehdi Karroubi (reformist cleric and Green Movement leader).
A parliamentary figure and presidential candidate in 2005 and 2009, Karroubi became closely associated with rights-based and justice-oriented discourse in Iran. Due to house arrest, he has issued no recent statements. His last known positions emphasized the liberation of Jerusalem through international negotiations rather than armed struggle. He also criticized excessive spending on regional wars, arguing that revolutionary rhetoric should not erode domestic credibility.
Sixth: Mahmoud Sariolghalam (political adviser and academic).
One of Iran’s most prominent technocratic theorists of reform, Sariolghalam views the conflict with the United States as fundamentally philosophical and conceptual rather than nuclear or security-based. He argues that excessive focus on the nuclear file obscures the deeper issue of Iran’s position within the international system. Despite his past association with reformist governments, he has articulated clear rationalist positions, stating explicitly that no country can prosper without normal relations with the United States. He maintains that strengthening the domestic sphere must be Iran’s strategic priority. In recent months, he has criticized the illusion of “permanent hostility” toward the West and linked economic stability to rebuilding trade relations with Europe and the Arab world rather than sustaining confrontation with Washington. On Palestine, he treats the issue as a legitimate ethical and political cause but rejects transforming it into a permanent strategic burden.
Seventh: Seyyed Mohammad Ali Abtahi (former vice president).
A prominent advocate of dialogue with the West, Abtahi is typically classified within the tactical engagement camp. He has argued that Iran’s long-standing support for Palestinian resistance stemmed from Israel’s status as an occupying power, while acknowledging his own involvement in secret diplomatic contacts with U.S. officials. He warns that eliminating channels of dialogue—what he refers to as abolishing the “fifth column”—would only deepen domestic instability.
Eighth: Ali Motahari (former member of parliament and moderate cleric).
Occupying a middle position between reformists and conservatives, Motahari has sharply criticized the triad of “the damned American, the infidel Zionist, and internal corruption,” arguing that it has devolved into empty mobilizational rhetoric incapable of addressing real economic and social crises. He contends that a broad segment of Iranian youth has grown weary of hollow politics and demands that livelihood and economic priorities take precedence over grand slogans. Motahari has repeatedly called for a reassessment of priorities in handling the Palestinian issue so that domestic suffering is not neglected in the name of external causes. Politically, he has stated that growing numbers within Iran now support direct negotiations with the United States and that opponents of this path are increasingly unable to block it.
Ninth: Hassan Rouhani (former moderate president).
Rouhani is frequently invoked as the face of the “agreement in exchange for partial sanctions relief” formula. He has consistently supported cautious engagement with Washington under the pressure of sanctions and economic strain. While he does not present himself as abandoning Palestine, he advances the view that de-escalation with the United States is a prerequisite for internal stability. He has stated explicitly that Iran does not seek a military war with the United States and continues to express rhetorical support for Palestinians. On the fortieth anniversary of the revolution, he warned of a youth awakening against elites governed by absolute hostility.
Tenth: Fereydoun Majlesi (former diplomat).
With family ties to influential circles and a personal history that includes years of imprisonment, Majlesi has appeared in Iranian media debates surrounding flexibility and reconciliation with Washington. He argues that calls for negotiation may represent the beginning of the end of long-standing hostility toward the United States. He embodies a current of diplomatic rationalism that views continued estrangement as more costly than beneficial for Iran.
Eleventh: Ali Akbar Salehi (former foreign minister).
Having served as foreign minister and head of the Atomic Energy Organization, Salehi is frequently cited in Iranian debates advocating direct negotiations with the United States. While he does not espouse an “Iran First” approach implying withdrawal from Palestine, he represents a current within the system that views negotiation as a necessary tool for managing external pressure.
Twelfth: Abbas Araghchi (foreign minister).
Araghchi has issued repeated statements affirming that a nuclear agreement remains possible if Washington demonstrates “realism.” During the June 2025 war, he was reported to have held direct telephone contacts with the U.S. envoy as part of efforts to identify a diplomatic exit. This does not necessarily signal a preference for comprehensive reconciliation, but it does indicate the existence of an internal channel that views managing tension with Washington as essential to avoiding worst-case outcomes.
Thirteenth: Kamal Kharrazi (former foreign minister and adviser to the Supreme Leader).
In his capacity as a senior adviser, Kharrazi has affirmed Iran’s readiness for indirect negotiations with the United States. This format is typically employed when engagement is deemed necessary but direct talks carry high political cost. He represents a figure from the upper echelons of the system who signals possibility without crossing established red lines.
Fourteenth: Saeed Leylaz (reformist economic analyst).
Leylaz has argued that Iran worked to secure a ceasefire in Gaza in order to avoid a broader war and obtain incentives. He praised Iran’s decision not to intervene militarily alongside Hamas, warning against falling into a strategic trap. His positions align with a current advocating the reduction of the costs associated with Gaza and Palestine.
Fifteenth: Kourosh Ahmadi (political analyst).
Ahmadi argues that since the beginning of the Gaza war, Iran has pursued two objectives: avoiding direct involvement in the conflict and halting Israeli attacks on Gaza. He consistently articulates a balance favored by Iran’s rationalist elite, combining political support for the Palestinian cause with efforts to minimize direct risks to Iran itself.
Sixteenth: Abbas Abdi (reformist political theorist).
One of the most influential thinkers within the reformist current, Abdi is among the clearest voices critiquing the domestic costs of Iran’s regional policies. He does not call for withdrawal from the Palestinian issue, but persistently raises a central question: what have Iranians gained from policies of open-ended confrontation? He places improving relations with the West, including the United States, at the core of any viable socio-economic rescue strategy. His importance lies in translating the slogan “Iran First” from popular sentiment into a rational, elite-level discourse.
Seventeenth: Mir-Hossein Mousavi (Prime Minister of Iran, 1981–1989).
Mousavi represents a complex symbolic case: a figure rooted in the revolutionary system who, after 2009, evolved into a fundamental critic of state practice. In his political statements, he consistently rejects the use of external conflicts to justify internal failure, emphasizing popular sovereignty and national dignity. He neither calls for reconciliation with Washington nor for abandonment of Palestine, but his discourse establishes ethical and political limits on the export of crises beyond Iran’s borders.
Eighteenth: Saeed Hajjarian (reformist strategist and political thinker).
One of the most significant intellectual architects of reformist thought, Hajjarian was among the earliest to argue that direct confrontation—internally and externally—is unwinnable. He proposed dismantling confrontation through gradualism, flexibility, and the reordering of priorities. He conceptualizes the state as a system of interests rather than a permanent arena of ideological struggle and maintains that sustained tension with the United States forecloses any genuine prospects for internal reform. Accordingly, he clearly belongs to the camp advocating disengagement from Washington as a prerequisite for political and economic transformation. On Palestine, he does not advance an abandonment narrative but criticizes the instrumentalization of foreign policy as a perpetual tool of internal mobilization.
Nineteenth: Hassan Khomeini (reformist cleric and grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic).
Hassan Khomeini constitutes one of the most important symbolic bridges between the revolutionary identity of the Islamic Republic and reformist calls for reducing international isolation. While avoiding detailed discussion of relations with the United States, he has expressed support for the nuclear negotiation track and criticized the logic of permanent rupture and isolation. He argues that preserving the system does not contradict redefining Iran’s relationship with the world. His significance lies less in specific policy positions than in his symbolic weight as a reformist voice emerging from within revolutionary legitimacy itself.
Twentieth: Abdolnaser Hemmati (former central bank governor and former presidential candidate).
A leading representative of the “economy first” current, Hemmati consistently linked Iran’s economic recovery to ending chronic confrontation with the United States, both during his tenure in executive office and throughout his presidential campaign. He spoke openly about the costs of sanctions and criticized the illusion that pivoting eastward could compensate for estrangement from the West. In his view, continued rupture with Washington eliminates any prospect of financial and monetary stability. He approaches foreign policy from a functional perspective, treating de-escalation with the West as a necessary condition for halting socio-economic decline.
Twenty-first: Ali Larijani (former parliamentary speaker and former nuclear negotiator).
Larijani is among the most prominent pragmatic figures in Iran’s political system, having played key roles in managing the nuclear file and engaging with Western counterparts during sensitive periods. Despite his conservative background, he adopts a realist approach that views open confrontation with the United States as detrimental to state interests and regards negotiation as an essential tool for managing international balances. He does not advocate ideological reconciliation with Washington, nor does he promote withdrawal from the Palestinian issue. Instead, he frames these files through the lens of statecraft rather than mobilization, arguing that excessive hostility constrains Iran’s strategic maneuverability. His importance lies in his institutional credibility and his ability to frame compromise as a sovereign choice rather than a political retreat.
Twenty-second: Eshaq Jahangiri (former first vice president).
One of the most prominent representatives of the reformist executive wing, Jahangiri distinguished himself by political boldness that at times exceeded that of the president he served under. He explicitly linked structural corruption to the persistence of sanctions, criticizing external confrontation as a cover for internal governance failures rather than a carefully calculated strategic choice.
Twenty-third: Hossein Dehghan (former minister of defense and adviser to the Supreme Leader).
Dehghan represents one of the rare voices from within Iran’s military-security establishment inclined toward a realist approach in managing relations with the United States. He has spoken of the need for a “calculated settlement” with Washington, emphasizing that open confrontation is neither an inevitable fate nor a permanent strategic option, but a high-cost path that risks long-term exhaustion without clear gains. He does not advance a conciliatory political or ideological discourse, nor does he call for abandoning deterrence, but he clearly distinguishes between managing conflict and allowing it to escalate into open war. His significance stems from his position within the security-military sphere, which lends particular weight to this perspective.
Twenty-fourth: Masoud Pezeshkian (President of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 28 July 2024).
Within the formal power structure, Pezeshkian represents the face of “conditional de-escalation and controlled opening.” His approach draws a clearer link between economic recovery and reducing isolation, while seeking to manage tensions with Washington from within the system rather than outside it. His importance lies in the fact that he is not a commentator but the head of the executive branch that bears the daily cost of sanctions, making him a direct participant in the de-escalation current driven by domestic necessity.
Twenty-fifth: Mohammad Reza Aref (First Vice President in the Pezeshkian government).
Aref embodies the executive mind of the reformist–pragmatic camp and is often used as an institutional bridge between the discourse of openness and the calculations of the deep state. His inclusion completes the analytical map, as many policies aimed at “pressure reduction” are implemented in practice through the first vice presidency and bureaucratic-economic management networks rather than through public rhetoric.
Twenty-sixth: Ahmad Zeidabadi (journalist and political thinker).
Imprisoned for years after 2009, Zeidabadi is among the most explicit voices arguing that hostility with Washington has no realistic horizon and that tying regime legitimacy to conflict with the United States constitutes a recipe for slow internal collapse. He does not employ diplomatic language; instead, he attacks the logic of the “permanent enemy” as a tool of internal control rather than a coherent foreign policy. His discourse goes beyond traditional reformism and approaches the de-sacralization of conflict itself.
Twenty-seventh: Mohammad Reza Jalaeipour (academic and political activist).
Representing a new generation within the reformist current, Jalaeipour goes beyond calls for negotiation. He argues that sustained hostility with Washington erodes the middle class and eliminates any prospects for stability. In his view, revolutionary external discourse has become disconnected from Iranian society, and reconciliation with the world—centrally with the United States—is a prerequisite for reproducing the state, not merely improving its image. His importance lies in translating the reconciliation discourse into a social and generational language rather than an exclusively elite one.
Twenty-eighth: Mahmoud Sadeghi (former member of parliament).
Known for his public confrontations with security institutions, Sadeghi has argued that hostility toward the United States serves as a cover for shielding corruption from accountability. He maintains that Iran loses more strategically from isolation than it would from any negotiated settlement and calls explicitly for direct negotiations without intermediaries or ambiguous formulas. His discourse is less theoretical than Zeidabadi’s but more politically confrontational within institutional arenas.
Twenty-ninth: Peyman Molavi (economist, PhD graduate of the University of Essex).
An economist based in Tehran who runs an economics academy, Molavi strongly supports full reconciliation with the United States and consistently prioritizes economic considerations over ideological confrontation.
Thirtieth: Emadeddin Baghi (journalist, thinker, and human rights activist).
Known for his opposition to the death penalty and his advocacy for prisoners’ rights, Baghi argues that sustained hostility between Iran and the United States harms the Iranian people rather than political elites. He calls for dialogue and de-escalation, critiques policies on both sides, and opposes sanctions on the grounds that they inflict greater harm on citizens than on governments.
Implications and Findings
This mapping does not suggest that Iran has decided to close the chapter of confrontation with the United States or Israel, nor that it is abandoning the Palestinian cause. What it reveals is more precise and more consequential: a gradual shift in the state’s strategic mindset from a logic of open-ended confrontation to one of cost management. This distinction is not merely semantic. It redefines the function of foreign policy within Iran’s political system, reshapes the relationship between ideology and national security, and reorders the hierarchy between what is treated as principled and what is deemed negotiable.
The logic of open confrontation in Iran has long rested on the assumption that engagement with major adversaries is not simply a policy choice, but a foundational component of regime legitimacy. It has served as a mechanism for reinforcing revolutionary identity and sustaining internal cohesion through continuous mobilization. Within this framework, “deterrence through escalation” and “influence through attrition” take precedence over risk reduction, and the accumulation of multiple fronts becomes an integral part of power projection. By contrast, the logic of cost management does not negate rivalry, but reframes it as a condition to be contained rather than a permanent and inexhaustible destiny.
Under this emerging logic, the central question shifts from How do we win the confrontation? to How do we prevent it from becoming a strategic drain? Foreign policy is no longer primarily tasked with expanding external engagement, but with safeguarding the state’s capacity for internal resilience. Avoiding a large-scale war becomes an achievement in itself, not merely an interim phase.
Such transformations rarely take the form of formal declarations, as explicit announcements would impose significant domestic costs on regime legitimacy and ideological coherence. Instead, they proceed through more cautious mechanisms: adjusting the ceiling of acceptable discourse rather than changing direction outright, and adapting instruments rather than revising foundational principles.
Deep shifts within ideologically grounded systems are not measured by official documents, but by what might be described as an economy of speech. The focus is not on what is publicly proclaimed, but on what can be suggested indirectly, who is permitted to articulate it, and who is marginalized or penalized for doing so.
In the Iranian case, the expanding boundaries of permissible debate constitute the most sensitive and revealing indicator. When it becomes politically feasible to discuss direct negotiations, to question the cost of the regional axis, or to argue against transforming Gaza into “Iran’s war,” the issue is no longer one of individual boldness entering the public sphere. It signals that the system itself has begun, to varying degrees, to tolerate a reordering of the relationship between ideology, economy, and security.
When such discourse is confined to opposition figures or reformists, it can be dismissed as elite aspiration. Its extension to pragmatic conservatives, economic experts, and figures connected to state institutions, however, indicates that the shift reflects structural pressure on the state itself. In this context, discussion of accommodation with Washington becomes acceptable not as an ideological concession, but as an instrument of regime survival.
It is unlikely that this transformation will lead to the abandonment of Palestine. It will, however, almost certainly alter Palestine’s function within Iranian strategy. Historically, the Palestinian issue has been a core component of state identity and a source of both internal and external legitimacy. In the emerging phase of cost management—whose contours are still being tested—Palestine remains central in rhetoric, but efforts are underway to convert it from an open-ended commitment into a managed file governed by cost-benefit calculations.
This internal transition carries significant risks for the balance within the system. As the logic of accommodation with Washington advances and external disengagement from Iran’s regional axis deepens, the state is compelled to redefine the legitimacy of its mobilizational discourse. It must formulate a new equilibrium between revolution and statehood without undermining either. For this reason, the shift proceeds slowly and deliberately, advancing through language before policy, and through recalibrating limits before altering trajectories.
In sum, Iran is not abandoning its ideology, but reordering it under far more constraining conditions. What the system seeks is a rationality of survival rather than a rupture with the revolutionary framework. This is precisely what makes the transformation silent and difficult—and, at the same time, more analytically significant than any formal declaration.
