This report provides a structured assessment of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s performance during the large-scale military confrontation of February–March 2026, which placed the region at the center of direct conflict between the U.S.–Israeli axis and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The escalation reached sustained air and missile exchanges, resulting in repeated violations of Gulf state sovereignty.
Contrary to official narratives portraying the GCC as a cohesive bloc, field data analyzed by the Gulf Security Hub reveals an unprecedented level of strategic fragmentation. The conflict did not override intra-Gulf divisions. It reproduced them under maximum pressure. Divergence persisted in threat assessment, in the prioritization of external alliances, and in the effectiveness of collective defense protocols.
The confrontation constituted a decisive stress test for the GCC framework. The results demonstrate that the consensual model failed under operational conditions. National-level retrenchment prevailed. Airspace and maritime domains turned into fragmented operational theaters. Each state acted according to its own calculations. Political and operational synchronization remained minimal. Two patterns became particularly visible: technical paralysis and deliberate non-coordination. These dynamics were most evident in military communication channels and real-time radar data exchange at critical moments. The absence of integrated situational awareness undermined the formation of a unified operational picture. Available evidence indicates that divergence extended beyond technical limitations to include uneven prior knowledge of the conflict’s timing, scope, and objectives.
The complete absence of the Peninsula Shield Force from the operational theater raises fundamental questions about its strategic relevance. The force’s land-based structure proved incompatible with the demands of fifth-generation warfare. Continued reliance on conventional military formations to confront transnational, technology-driven threats constitutes a high-cost strategic risk.
The report concludes that the GCC collective security system has entered a phase of functional stagnation. Gulf capitals now operate as semi-autonomous security units. This shift necessitates a redefinition of Gulf national security on realistic foundations that move beyond integration assumptions untested in practice.
