Information warfare in the Gulf is no longer merely a reflection of troubled domestic policies, episodic external interference, or the spillover effects of major regional conflicts. Over recent years, it has evolved into a conflict instrument in its own right within the Gulf system. It now operates according to an autonomous logic and functions as a tool of pressure and repositioning that rivals traditional political instruments in effectiveness.
What was once managed through closed diplomatic channels or contained within cautious margins of divergence is now conducted openly in the digital sphere through covert propaganda, functional leaks, and networks of automated accounts embedded within deliberate and carefully orchestrated influence campaigns. In this shift, the definition of the adversary has changed, as have the tools of coercion themselves. The arena of confrontation has expanded in an uncontrolled manner to encompass public consciousness, treated as a domain open to shaping and manipulation through every available technical and psychological means.
This transformation cannot be separated from the broader regional context. It has moved beyond passive exposure to external dynamics toward the active production of wars aimed at distorting perception and reshaping awareness. Gulf states no longer occupy the position of passive recipients of competing narratives generated by regional powers such as Iran and Israel. They have become active participants in creating their own disinformation environments, used to consolidate influence, delineate roles, or transmit unspoken political messages through intermediaries who hold no formal status, operate within precisely calculated margins, and know when to advance and when to withdraw.
The recent Saudi–Emirati disagreement over Yemen offers a revealing illustration of this slide from political divergence into information confrontation. As priorities in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi diverged on the Yemeni file, disputes shifted from political and military coordination toward competition over narratives. This transition was never declared as a rupture. It was instead displaced into the digital sphere through campaigns of vilification conducted in a language that oscillates between serious analysis and fabricated leaks. The objective has been to redefine who bears responsibility for failure and who embodies “rationality” and “realism” in the eyes of both domestic and external audiences.
Yemen has effectively become a laboratory for a Gulf-on-Gulf information war. Digital discourse reveals an escalation in reciprocal defamation campaigns. Saudi policies are portrayed as an open-ended war of attrition with no clear political horizon, while the Emirati role is framed as a long-term project aimed at dismantling Yemeni unity. What stands out is that such narratives rarely originate from official media outlets or direct government statements. They are instead disseminated through networks of automated accounts, guided influencers, and political analysis platforms that present themselves as independent, even as their linguistic structures and charged rhetoric reveal clear political alignments.
These reciprocal campaigns are frequently accompanied by forged documents, selectively edited audio recordings, or anonymous sources presented as exclusive leaks. While they target both states simultaneously, their purpose is not the pursuit of truth. Their aim is to entrench politically and socially charged perceptions rooted in hostility among elite circles and attentive publics. It requires little emphasis to note that a significant portion of these campaigns is the product of Gulf-based information operations rather than external interference alone.
Gulf states resort to this form of information confrontation because direct confrontation carries high political and strategic costs. The digital environment provides ample room for maneuver and pressure without assuming explicit political responsibility. Information warfare in this context is not designed to win over the Gulf public as a single collective. It is calibrated to target specific segments with precision, including journalists, researchers, opinion shapers, and analysts. Through this targeting, narratives are able to penetrate deeper circles of influence where positions are formed and long-term perceptions are consolidated.
At its core, Gulf-on-Gulf cyber conflict is not aimed at toppling rivals or dismantling existing alliances. Its purpose lies in recalibrating lines of influence and redefining the limits of role and reach within a system characterized by intersecting interests and competing ambitions. In the Yemeni case, this is reflected in each side’s effort to present itself as the more pragmatic actor and the one most capable of preserving regional stability, while depicting the other as a political and security liability. These conclusions are not imposed abruptly. They are planted gradually through coordinated campaigns, carefully timed media leaks, and selective reports that saturate a digital environment dense with bots and artificial amplification mechanisms.
What heightens the danger of these tactics is that the tools employed in these internal cyber conflicts are identical to those used by hostile external actors. In doing so, Gulf states leave the door open to sustained investment in a toxic environment saturated with animosity and resentment, one that remains highly vulnerable to penetration and repurposing. Fabricated materials laden with misleading content continue to exert a cumulative impact even after their falsity is exposed. Such effects prove difficult to erase from public memory or elite perceptions.
This Gulf information confrontation intersects with the region’s most acute conflict, namely the Iran–Israel confrontation, without dissolving into it. The tools are the same. The platforms are the same. In some cases, even the digital intermediaries appear to be the same. Research reports published by Citizen Lab demonstrate that influence networks do not operate according to fixed ideological alignments. They move across issues and arenas depending on funding sources and immediate objectives. This reality allows the disinformation infrastructure used against Iran or in its favor to be redeployed with ease in internal Gulf conflicts, requiring only minor adjustments in language and messaging.
The most troubling aspect of this landscape is that the Gulf is engaging in these information wars in the absence of any shared regulatory or ethical framework. The Gulf Cooperation Council, which previously failed to contain the 2017 crisis before it erupted, still lacks a collective mechanism for managing digital disputes or regulating mutual discourse among its members. The result is an open arena in which disagreements are managed beneath the surface, while their cumulative effects deepen within public consciousness, distort inter-Gulf perceptions, and shape external elite assessments of regional cohesion.
The consequences extend beyond inter-state relations into the domestic sphere of each state. When Gulf societies become accustomed to narratives of suspicion, accusation, and leaks, even when directed at a “Gulf partner,” such discourse becomes easily redirected inward during moments of political or economic stress. What is used today to manage an external disagreement may tomorrow become an instrument for settling internal scores. From this perspective, Gulf information wars are not merely tactical political tools. They represent a structural risk to state stability itself.
This pattern is likely to intensify due to three interlinked factors. The first is the persistence of geopolitical competition within the Gulf. The second is the growing complexity of regional files such as Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The third is the declining capacity of digital platforms to regulate or contain coordinated influence campaigns. Added to this is the absence of effective political channels for managing disagreements, which encourages the use of digital space as an undeclared substitute for diplomacy.
Against this backdrop, there is an urgent need to redefine the concept of Gulf security to include inter-Gulf information security as a central pillar of regional stability. A genuine challenge lies in regulating Gulf states’ own use of disinformation tools and in preventing political disagreements from devolving into wars of perception conducted at the expense of societies and their collective awareness.
The most dangerous aspect of information warfare in the Gulf lies in the fact that it is waged in the name of realism, truth, and the public good, while producing over the medium term a fragile environment that external actors can easily penetrate and exploit. Gulf states face adversaries who deploy artificial intelligence, bots, and systematic falsification. They also confront themselves when they allow these same tools to become a normalized language for managing disputes within the Gulf. At that point, the struggle for sovereignty is no longer directed solely outward. It unfolds from within the Gulf itself.
